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Abstract 
 
 
Transgender identities have historically been faced with erasure by the cisgender community, particularly 
through being forced to use cisgender terminology to define their own non-conforming experiences. This 
systemic cisgender inscription upon transgender identity is seen clearly through Bernice Hausman’s 
medicalizing reading of transgender narratives, leading her to falsely conclude that transgender 
individuals perpetuate the cisgender binary. I argue that Hausman’s analysis denies trans individuals the 
right to speak for themselves, thus denying them the agency of creating their own narratives. In the wake 
of this particular form of gender violence, the transgender community must create their own method of 
narrative construction and analysis. By rereading gender into Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of 
sexuality, I create a trans phenomenology as a way to read and analyze trans narratives. Focusing on 
Merleau-Ponty’s description of sexuality as reciprocally reflecting existence through his case study of the 
“silent, heartbroken girl,” I argue that through narrative, we see that gender, too, reciprocally reflects 
existence. Applying this framework to rereadings of trans narratives, I not only show how gender is truly 
lived, but offer a uniquely positive account of transgender identity by focusing on individuals’ own 
descriptions of themselves, thereby reclaiming the trans narrative on trans terms.  
  
  
 
 
 
 
Transgender identities have historically been faced with erasure by the gender-
conforming (or cisgender) community, particularly through being forced to use 
cisgender terminology to define their own non-conforming experience. This systemic 
cisgender inscription upon transgender identity is seen clearly in Bernice Hausman’s 
attempt to describe transgender narratives as perpetuating gender norms, ignoring the 
fact that trans individuals are forced to define themselves through cisgender definitions. 
The invisibility, dehumanization, and ultimate inability to speak on one’s behalf in the 
language of one’s own unique gender is a certain type of oppression upon transgender 
individuals. In the wake of this oppression, the transgender community must create 
their own method of speaking about their multiplicity of experiences. By rereading 
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gender into phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s work where he describes 
sexuality as fully reflective of and reflected in existence, I construct and then apply a 
specifically transgender phenomenology to trans  narratives. Through this method, I not 
only show through these narratives how gender is truly lived, but offer a uniquely 
positive account of transgender identity by focusing on the individual’s own 
descriptions of themselves, thereby reclaiming the trans narrative on trans terms.  
 
Feminist theorist Bernice Hausman stands in a long line of oppressive medical analyses 
of transgender narratives. The need for the trans phenomenology that I will later create 
is motivated by the way in which Hausman inscribes her own medicalizing and gender 
essentialist language onto transgender narratives. In her work “Body, Technology, and 
Gender in Transsexual Autobiographies,” she views trans narratives as feeding into and 
being fed by medical discourse, propagating gender stereotypes (Hausman 335). 
Hausman claims that transgender identities “compromise the official understanding of 
‘gender’ as divorced from biological sex,” while in reality it is this difference which is 
at the heart of the transgender experience (336).   
 
For Hausman, the “plausible history” story allegedly developed by transgender 
individuals to be approved for gender-reassignment surgery perpetuates a single, 
totalized “official history” (336). This “official history” describes the trans individual 
as having the “wrong body,” a conception which perpetuates non-ambiguous, gender-
stereotyped norms within trans identity (Hausman 335). As such, she argues that the 
trans “obsession” with surgically altering their anatomy to align with an identity means 
that they are more concerned with the gender binary than cisgender individuals 
(Hausman 338). She further calls gender-affirmation surgery “cross-sex identification,” 
confusing gender affirmation with a pathological desire to be “the other sex” within a 
cisgender binary (Hausman 336). She uses medicalizing and pathologizing terminology 
like “condition” or “phenomenon” to describe the trans experience, demonstrating a 
commitment to using a cisgender binary to describe the trans experience (336). While 
Hausman expresses a wish to move transsexualism out of its medicalization, she does 
so by placing the blame of this medicalization on transgender individuals rather than 
the cisgender medical criterion to which trans individuals must adhere. Her medical 
focus on the body is reductive, making it appear as if one’s account of one’s gender lies 
only in their surgical transformation rather than the way they describe and account for 
themselves. In fact, in reading transgender narratives as perpetuating medical gender 
stereotypes, Hausman actually further medicalizes and pathologizes the trans 
experience, counterproductively taking up the position she seeks to refute.  
 
We can turn to Hausman’s own readings of well-known trans narratives to see the way 
in which she employs this gender binary, as well as furthers the embodiment of 
transgender individuals that reduces gender identity to bodily descriptions rather than 
descriptions of identity. Hausman reads sections of famous transwoman Jan Morris’ 
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autobiography Conundrum, attempting to use it as a depiction of a pathological 
obsession with the body. Morris writes,  
 
“[...] [Gender] is the essentialness of oneself, the psyche, the fragment of unity. 
 
I was born with the wrong body, being feminine by gender but male by sex, and 
I could achieve completeness only when the one was adjusted to the other. 
 
All I wanted was liberation, or reconciliation--to live as myself, to clothe myself 
in a more proper body, and achieve Identity at last. 
 
I had reached Identity.” (qtd. Hausman 350).1 
 
In this, Hausman reads the words “wong body” and, rather than accounting for the 
context of the narrative and what Morris herself is trying to convey about her own 
identity, reads this as a simple and reductive pathological statement in which she 
unambiguously wants to become a cisgender woman (Hausman 350). She sees this as 
demonstrative of a pathology, of “transsexualism as a disorder spun out in dazzling 
detail” and suggesting that because Morris does not mention physiological, but rather 
spiritual and psychological, “causes” for her transsexualism, she is more ready to 
uphold a gender binary than those who follow the heteronormative pairing of sex and 
gender (350). Reading only sections depicting their surgery, Hausman claims that there 
is a “discontinuity between the story of surgical sex change and the story of already 
being the other sex,” and in arguing so, further employs the cisgender binary rather than 
reading an account of one happening to use surgery as a way to affirm their own 
identity (Hausman 357). 
 
Hausman’s claims come not simply from a refusal to recognize the cis inscription that 
occurs prior to trans narrative and oppressively envelops it, but from an active 
employment of a cisgender binary to describe transgender experience, which is 
necessarily outside of this binary. And so, where she reads trans narratives as 
perpetuating cis stereotypes, she should really be recognizing the oppression that has 
forced trans narratives to take up cis language and definition. Through her misreading 
of trans narratives and the way in which she misplaces the blame of medicalization onto 
trans individuals instead of the medicalized cis inscription which clouds authentic 
narrative, Hausman effectively denies trans individuals the agency of their own 
narratives, instead suggesting “that it is technology and not narrative [or the transgender 
individual themselves] that ‘makes’ the transsexual” (Prosser 134). She thus denies that 
trans individuals have the right to speak for themselves, and denies them the agency of 
creating their own narrative. 
 
                                                          
1 From Morris, Jan, Conundrum (1974). 
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Moreover, analyses such as Hausman’s ignore the most telling aspect of trans 
narratives—that trans narrative is an act, and one of trans individuals accounting for 
themselves, bearing witness to their lives, and is thus a strong reflection of one’s 
identity. Indeed, as transgender male and theorist Jay Prosser suggests, “narrative is a 
reflection, above all, of our capacity to represent ourselves” (134). As an act of self-
identification, of bearing witness, what analyses of trans narratives must do then, quite 
simply, is to actually read the narratives.  
 
Hausman flaw was describing the trans experience through all but trans narratives, even 
when reading and analyzing trans narratives. Medical discourse, and reading medical 
discourse too heavily into trans narratives keep these narratives from being read with 
focus on individuals describing themselves. Further, I criticize Hausman’s dismissal of 
the fundamental attributes of narrative that make trans narratives such a powerful tool 
of gender affirmation. Trans narrative is a form of self -creation, a site of self-
affirmation, and ultimately an act that affirms and produces agency. These attributes of 
narrative are not only fundamental to the lives of transgender individuals, but at the 
heart of the trans experience. The authorial power of trans narratives has been lost by 
Hausman’s medicalizing and dismissive readings, and must be regained through a new 
methodology created on trans terms. 
 
In what follows, I create a trans phenomenology through rereading gender into Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of sexuality in his work The Phenomenology of Perception. I 
argue for this trans phenomenology as a way to read and analyze trans narratives in their 
own light and on their own terms. I focus on Merleau-Ponty’s description of sexuality as 
wholly reflecting existence without being reduced to the body, through his case study of 
the “silent, heartbroken girl” in order to argue that gender, too, is not reducible to the 
body and that it is wholly reflected in and wholly reflective of identity. I argue that this 
reciprocally reflective existence is fully realized in trans narrative, and that Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology is a method by which this becomes clear. Through 
understanding the reflective existence of the girl without a voice, we can understand why 
the trans community so desperately needs one. In creating a trans phenomenology with 
trans-affirming criteria, I lay the groundwork for a method by which to reread trans 
narratives that can subvert current, medicalizing discourse such as Hausman’s.  
 
A method for reading trans narratives must be akin to the trans experience itself. As 
such, it must firstly and most fundamentally, show trans lives as lived and thus livable, 
to paraphrase Naomi Scheman (qtd. Jacob Hale’s Rules). Further, a methodology must 
offer a positive account of gender as a lived experience, irreducible to the body, rather 
than a medicalized problem of having the “wrong body.” Finally, it must leave room 
for individuality and self-creation, as the trans experience is unique and not bound 
together by strict “official history” but operates through self-creation. A trans 
phenomenology via Merleau-Ponty must take on these criteria.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s case study within his account of sexuality of the “silent, heartbroken 
girl” presents a clear image of identity as having a reciprocal relationship with 
existence itself. One’s identity is not just a part of their existence, but their existence 
reflects their identity, and their identity creates their existence. A methodology which 
does not reduce the self to mind nor body is particularly useful to counter medicalized 
discourse, which focuses on the body as comprising one’s identity without 
consideration of what this body reflects. For Merleau-Ponty, sexuality is not simply a 
biological function or internal state represented or reflected in the body, but a point of 
grounding and of action (184). Sexuality does not just occur within the body, but rather 
is fundamentally and reciprocally reflected by existence in the body.  
 
We can see an example of this reciprocally reflective existence in Merleau-Ponty’s case 
study of a girl who, heartsick, loses her ability to speak. For Merleau-Ponty, sexuality is 
as fundamental a bodily function as one’s ability to speak; her aphasia, a bodily 
condition, does not simply occur as a reflection of her heartbreak, but rather, her 
heartbreak, fully reflected in and reflective of existence, is aphasia (186). He makes it 
clear that her loss of speech is not simply a reflection of her heartbreak; it is not a mere 
representation. In fact, “the sign does not only convey its significance, it is filled with 
it” (Merleau-Ponty 186, italics mine). And because of this “being filled with,” that is, 
because the significance is vital to the sign itself, her symptom is not a reflection but is 
the relation between herself and others, her past and her present, in fact, all of the 
“fundamental dimensions of existence” (Merleau-Ponty 186). And so, sexuality for 
Merleau-Ponty wholly reflects existence, and is wholly reflected in existence.  
 
When we apply this discussion of sexuality to an account of gender non-conformity, we 
get a clearer view of the non-reductive self-creation required by transgender 
individuals. For, in the phenomenological sense, gender is not merely a route of 
expressing one’s personal identity. Gender is fully synthesized in our experience, in our 
daily lives, it is reciprocally expressed in existence: I express my existence through my 
gender, but my gender expresses my existence. Both sustain and permeate one another, 
affecting and effecting each other. And indeed, the body “can symbolize existence 
because it realizes it and is its actuality,” but this means not that the mind is the body, 
but rather that the transgender body in the world is also the transgender self in the 
world (Merleau-Ponty 190). In simpler terms, we don’t simply live with a gender, we 
live gender. By getting away from the focus on internal states and the idea of 
consciousness, Merleau-Ponty is able to view the body not as simply an expression of 
the mind, but as being the site of experience, as shaping our internal state as much as it 
expresses it (185).  
 
When we say then that gender and sexuality are lived, we do not simply mean that we 
have a gender or a sexuality that is expressed in our lives and our bodies. We mean that 
there is a reciprocal relationship between the two—we live out our genders in such a 
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way that we effect them, and they in turn affect us (Merleau-Ponty 183-5). Similarly, 
sexuality is not simply a part of our existence, or even a mode of expression or a 
“manifestation of personal existence” (185). Rather, it fully permeates existence, and is 
involved in the body and life in such a way that one’s body and psyche “are involved in 
a relationship of reciprocal expression,” such that the loss of the girl’s sexuality is her 
loss of voice, and the repression of one’s gender, or the reduction of it, implicates the 
loss of one’s identity, or ability to describe it. (Merleau-Ponty 185).   
 
Gender can be read here in the same context as sexuality because of the similar ways in 
which they are reflected in and reflective of the self. One’s gender is fully represented 
in one’s body, particularly due to the cisgender conflation of gender and anatomical 
sex. Gender is also fully represented in the ways in which one constructs their identity, 
particularly in terms of self-reference. One’s gender is truly lived in a similar way to 
sexuality, reflecting one’s identity while also constructing it through language, fashion, 
behavior, and particularly the ways that one describes themselves. In fact, we might 
view this reflecting and reflective-existence as a mark of identity affirmation. We can 
then view the positive, body descriptive trans narratives not as signs of gender 
stereotypes and cis inscription, but as the site where this reciprocally, reflectively 
existent, self is truly realized.  
 
Further, if one’s gender is wholly reflected in and reflective of existence, and one of the 
main ways gender is expressed and constructed is through the way in which one 
describes themselves, then we might also view narrative as the site at which not only 
our trans phenomenology, but identity, is fully realized. Trans phenomenology then is 
the means by which we can positively view this reflective form of gender affirmation. 
The implications of this non-reductive, reflectively existent concept of gender as a 
methodology for describing the transgender experience is that self-creation, self-
definition, and autobiography are able to be central, as gender cannot be reduced to 
medicalized language nor external language that a cisgender society might try to 
impose upon it. And so, through a trans phenomenology created through rereading 
Merleau-Ponty, we can reread trans narratives in a new, positive light, without reducing 
the self-described lived experiences of trans individuals to a totalized “official history,” 
“wrong body,” or any other stereotype. In fact, we can read the trans narrative quite 
simply through reading it as is, by focusing on what is actually being said. Trans 
narratives can thus exist on their own terms.  
 
Applying this trans phenomenology to trans narratives allows us to give positive, trans 
rereadings of trans narratives which Hausman reads past and silences with her 
cisgender, medical inscription. Looking back on some of Hausman’s examples, 
particularly that of Morris’ narrative, we see descriptions of oneself after gender-
affirmation surgery not as descriptions of the “wrong body” being “corrected,” but of 
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one’s identity being positively reflected through whatever choices the person has made 
as an agent.  
 
Hausman, as previously discussed, sees our previous excerpt of Morris’as sucumbing to 
a pathological obsession with obtaining a cisgender body. But, in light of trans 
phenomenology’s demonstration of self-reference as reflective of identity, what’s 
actually being said here, beyond the discussion of physical transformation? For we 
know that at the time Morris wrote Conundrum, trans studies, and certainly not our 
more sex-liberating gender studies, had not yet developed, meaning that the only 
accounts of gender identity we truly had were necessarily cissexed. I believe that we 
can be charitable to Morris, recognizing society’s past ignorances that she too was led 
to believe, and instead truly reading her narrative for what she is actually trying to say, 
rather than nitpicking a historical and lesser issue as Hausman does. While we may give 
credence to Hausman’s view in that we do want to move the trans narrative out of the 
cisgender categories it has been oppressively held in, we want to do so by giving the 
trans community a voice, not by speaking for it, as Hausman does.  
 
Quite simply, Morris describes having a feeling of being herself, having unity and agency 
that she did not when she was not free to express herself, both physically and 
emotionally, as she pleased. Yes, there is an explicit reference to having the “wrong 
body” here, but I find this much less interesting than the way in which Morris depicts the 
intricate role of identity as reflected and reflective of the body and existence. Once she 
transitioned, she became  “herself”. This is not merely to say that she received a properly 
sexed body, and was now this body. That is what Hausman’s analysis amounts to. Rather, 
in this we can see something far more intricate and important being described—the mark 
of identity agency and affirmation. This is not just a body; this is a self. 
 
Let’s look at another section of Morris, which Sandy Stone in her work The Empire 
Strikes Back also references as medicalized and gender-essentialist. Here, Morris 
writes: 
 
“I feel small, and neat. I am not small in fact, and not terribly neat either, but 
femininity conspires to make me feel so. My blouse and skirt are light, bright, 
crisp. My shoes make my feet look more delicate than they are, besides giving 
me...a suggestion of vulnerability that I rather like [...] when I walk out into the 
street I feel consciously ready for the world’s appraisal, in a way that I never 
felt as a man” (Morris qtd. Stone 225).2 
 
We can reread this quote not as being obsessed with being viewed as female at the price 
of a lack of agency, as Stone suggests and as Hausman would agree, but rather as 
Morris describing physical, tangible parts of herself that would otherwise seem 
                                                          
2 From Morris, Jan, Conundrum (1974). 
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negatively vulnerable. She is happy and seems to feel in control even at the idea of 
being “small” and vulnerable to the world—a feeling which normally incites panic. 
How can we read this as gender affirming? What once made her feel “unready for the 
world’s appraisal” now allows her to feel properly contained in her body, properly 
ready and conscious of the world’s gaze without fear. This positive description of 
vulnerability should not be read as Morris become a stereotypical woman, but of 
reclaiming her sense of self so that she no longer feels dysphoric in her body, as a 
person in the world.  
 
One of the common threads found in both our Morris excerpts is an authorial 
confidence, a positive reclamation of vulnerability. The way one reads oneself is 
indicative of one’s mental states—being comfortable in one’s body is not simply 
expressed in language, one’s gender-affirmation is expressed by the body, by the 
feeling “small” and “neat,” which is then expressed in language. Affirmation, like the 
reverse case of Merleau-Ponty’s silent girl, reflects itself in the body (and so one’s 
feeling of occupying space, one’s fashion choice, etc.) and this further affirms the self, 
while further reflecting more of the body. It is a reflectively existent process that shows 
that this type of surgery shouldn’t be looked down upon as upholding a binary, nor 
should these narratives be read as a simple justification for body mutilation. To do so, 
as Hausman does, is to further contribute a cisgender imposition onto what a 
transgender individual should be or desire. We should instead read trans narratives, 
descriptive of a need for physical transition or not, as reclamations of the trans 
experience, and of one’s individual identity. Trans narratives are positive accounts of 
transgender experiences—narrative reclamations that exist on their own terms. 
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